Miller [6] describes as a "revolution" in financial innovation that has occurred over the last 20 years. Miller [6] regretfully concedes that the major impulses to successful financial innovations over the past 20 years have come from regulations and taxes. The question which arises, however, is whether these innovations are truly breakthroughs or merely neutral mutations of previously existing instruments. Exchangeable debt is one example of a financial instrument which made only minor modifications to a previously existing instrument-convertible debt and was marketed as an instrument which offered unique tax advantages. Though it is easy (and probably correct) to conclude that tax considerations led to the development of exchangeable debentures, the question addressed here is whether these tax considerations are a potential source of value for issuing firms. The major conclusion of this research is that exchangeable debt constitutes a divestment strategy which has no unique tax advantages over other divestment strategies such as block sales or secondary distributions. Despite the fact that investment houses marketed exchangeable debt as a means by which corporations could capitalize on specific features of the tax code, none of the tax explana- 48 
tions considered provides a compelling motivation for issuing exchangeable debt. The most compelling justification for issuing exchangeable debt is non-tax-related and has previously been ignored -namely, the underwriting fees and valuation effects associated with exchangeable debentures are substantially less than those associated with secondary distributions where the investor is left holding the convert's stock.
The first conclusion of this paper is that firms issue exchangeable debt conditional on having made a decision to divest of an intercorporate holding. Firms, on average, divest of a block of stock when there is negative information regarding the future prospects of the firm. The documented negative price reactions at the announcement of secondary distributions (Mikkelson and Partch [5] ), block sales (Holthausen, Leftwich and Mayers [3] ), and equity issues (Asquith and Mullins [ 1 ] ) are all consistent with this view. Exchangeable debt is an alternative method of divesting of a block of stock which likewise is used when the convert firm's future prospects are not good. For example, IBM disposed of its Intel stock through an exchangeable debt issue because of Intel's "gloomy prospects."l Similarly, Intermark disposed of a portion of its Anthem Electronics common through an exchangeable debt issue after several years of poor earnings performance by Anthem. These facts are consistent with the view that exchangeable debt is essentially a divestment strategy.
The average abnormal price response of the convert firm's stock on the announcement of an exchangeable debt offering is -1 % over a two-day event window and reliably nonzero with an associated t-statistic of -2.30. This price response is less than that documented by Mikkelson and Partch [5] of -1.96% for nonregistered secondary offerings and -2.87% for registered secondary offerings. I argue the negative price response in the convert's stock is a result of information brought to the market regarding the convert's stock by the announcement of the exchangeable debt issue and is smaller in magnitude than the negative abnormal price response observed on the announcement of the sale of a block of equity by an informed party because of the repurchase guarantee implicit in exchangeable debt. Issuing firms offer a repurchase guarantee to investors in the exchangeable debt issue by guaranteeing to retain the convert firm's stock should that stock not appreciate subsequent to the issue. This is a much different outcome Wall Street Journal, February 12. 1986. See Appendix A for a summary of quotations from the financial press which are indicative of motivations which firms cite when issuing exchangeable debt. compared to that of an investor purchasing stock in a secondary distribution where the investor is left holding the stock.
The second question this research addresses is why exchangeable debt is chosen over alternative divestment strategies. Unfortunately, the answer here is not obvious.
In this paper, I analyze two tax benefits posed by Jones and Mason [4] and frequently cited in the financial press (see Appendix A) as motivating exchangeable debt issues. First, exchangeable debt allows the issuing firm to defer the realization of the capital gain on the convert's stock, if any, until the conversion feature is exercised. Second, a kind of tax arbitrage is available to issuers of exchangeable debt. The coupon payments to the bondholders are deductible as interest expense while the dividends received on the convert's stock receive a corporate dividend tax exclusion. Jones and Mason [4] argue that this differing tax treatment effectively lowers the coupon paid by the issuing firm on exchangeable debt issues. Neither of these tax hypotheses receive support from the data. Though particular issues of exchangeable debt were arguably motivated by tax considerations, many of the offerings clearly were not motivated by an attempt to capture dividend income on the convert stock (eight issues involved convert firms which were non-dividend-paying) or to defer the realization of capital gains (three issues involved convert stock on which the issuing firm would have realized a capital loss). Most importantly, though, there is no evidence that the tax considerations are a potential source of value for the issuing firms. Issuing firms, on average, experience no abnormal price response on the announcement of exchangeable debt issues.
Finally, I document that the underwriting costs of exchangeable offerings are less than those of secondary offerings making it a lower cost means of disposing of a block of stock. Though this appears to be a reasonable justification for using exchangeable debt as a divestment alternative, the paucity of exchangeable debt issues suggests this fact is either not well known or that there are other unidentified costs (for example, the negative information revealed by the issue) associated with the issuance of exchangeable debt.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section I contains a summary of the data used. Section II analyzes the price response of the convert and issuing firms. Section III describes possible motivations for issuing exchangeable debt. Concluding remarks are made in Section IV. 'Issuing firm's stake in converts was taken from many sources including annual reports, Wall Street Journal articles, Moody's Industrials, and prospectuses. The percent stake in the convert represents the stake held by the issuing firm at the announcement of the issue. Prospectuses were used as a primary source when possible. 2The convert firm is the parent of the issuing firm. 3The convert firm was the subject of a simultaneous equity carve-out by the issuing firm. 4The convert firm was the subject of a prior equity carve-out by the issuing firm. 5Shares in the convert firm were purchased in secondary markets around the announcement date to cover the exchange option of the debenture. 6This was a Eurobond and the issue date was not apparent from the announcement in the Wall Street Journal.
I. The Sample
I identified exchangeable debt offerings by reading footnotes to convertible bonds identified in Moody's Bond Record. The Capital Changes Reporter, Corporate Finance Sourcebook, and Registration and Offerings Statistics (ROS) database (compiled by the Securities and Exchange Commission) were used to identify the issue date of the debt securities. To identify the announcement dates of the debt offerings, I obtained the filing dates of the offerings. This procedure resulted in the identification of 37 exchangeable debt offerings over the period 1970 through 1987. Exhibit 1 lists the 37 exchangeable debt offerings and the percentage of the convert firm owned by the issuing firm, which ranges from no stake in the case of a subsidiary issuing debt exchangeable into the common stock of a parent to wholly owned in the case of a parent issuing debt exchangeable into the common stock of a subsidiary. The maturity of the debt ranges from ten to 25 years, with the majority having 25 years to maturity when issued. The convert firm was the target of a failed takeover attempt The convert firm was a majority owned subsidiary of the issuing firm The convert firm was the parent of the issuing firm The convert firm was the subject of an equity carve-out of the issuing firm; in three cases, the equity carve-out was simultaneous with the exchangeable debt offering; in three cases, the equity carve-out preceded the offering The issuing firm purchases the convert shares at the announcement of the exchangeable debt offering 
II. The Valuation Effects of Issuing Exchangeable Debt
In this section, I consider the valuation effects of issuing exchangeable debt to the convert and issuing firm. In the 3The Tenax debenture exchangeable into the common stock of Timken was subsequently called in July 1989. 4Both Newmont issues, the General Cinema issue convertible into Cadbury Schweppes, the latest Dart issue, and the IBM and Prudential offerings were all Eurobonds. 5Defined as price per share specified in the exchange option divided by the price of the convert stock at the announcement date. For example, the Petrie Stores issue provided investors with the opportunity to exchange each bond for 27 shares of Toys "R" Us common -a conversion price of $36. The price of Toys "R" Us common at announcement of the issue was $301/8). Thus, the conversion premium at announcement was 19.5%. Notes: 'The conversion premium is defined as price per share specified in the exchange option divided by the price of the convert stock at the announcement date (see footnote 5). 2The stake in the convert represents the percentage of the convert's common stock outstanding owned by the issuing firm. 3Market value of equity is the number of common shares outstanding times the stock price at the announcement of the issue. 
A. Event Study Methodology
The market model6 is used to estimate abnormal returns (ARit) and cumulative abnormal returns (CARit). The announcement day is defined as the earlier of the SEC filing date or the day preceding the Wall Street Journal publication date for each exchangeable debt issue. The parameter estimation period begins 51 days after the announcement day and ends 250 days after. The event window comprises the 101 days centered around the announcement day. Test 6For the NASDAQ stocks, the value-weighted NASDAQ market return is used. For NYSE/AMEX stocks, the value-weighted NYSE/AMEX market return is used.
statistics are estimated using the cross-sectional standard deviation of the abnormal return for each day.
B. Results
Exchangeable debt is a divestment strategy with a potentially informed investor (the issuer) disposing of a block of stock (the convert firm). For example, IBM was a major purchaser of Intel's products at the time of IBM's exchangeable debt issue, three of the issuers were parent companies and several of the issuers were prospective bidders in acquisition attempts. Accordingly, the abnormal price response of the convert firm at the announcement of the exchangeable debt issue should be negative and similar to other documented abnormal price responses at the announcement of the sale of a block of stock by an informed party. The financial press is replete with anecdotal evidence concerning the negative implications of an exchangeable debt issue about the future prospects of the convert firm (see Appendix A).
Data constraints result in 27 convert firms providing 30 observations and 25 issuing firms providing 31 observations. Exhibit 4 contains the average abnormal return for event day t, ARt, and the cumulative average abnormal return within the event window through event day r, CART, the associated t-statistics, and the percentage of abnormal returns greater than zero around the announcement day. I discuss the results for the convert firms and issuing firms in turn.
Around the announcement day, the cross-sectional average abnormal return for the convert firms, ARt, is Journal was considered the announcement date. 2Prediction errors were estimated in event time using the market model (see Section IIA).
ARt represents the mean prediction error across firms on event day t. CART represents the cumulative average prediction error from event day t = (-50, T).
negative from event day t = -2 through day t = 6 and is reliably negative on day 0. Moreover, the average abnormal return summed over the announcement event days The most plausible explanation of the negative two-day abnormal return for the convert firms on the announcement of an exchangeable debt issue is that information is revealed regarding the relation between the issuing and convert firms. The most transparent example is the case of a prospective merger. Issuing exchangeable debt is essentially a divestment strategy and thus would signal that there is at least a decreased likelihood of the existence of a bidder-target relation between the issuing and convert firms. This reduced likelihood in essence reveals not so much that the convert firm is overvalued, but, that the convert firm is no longer considered undervalued by the issuing firm and is thus a less likely target candidate. This The abnormal price response of the convert firm's common stock at the announcement of an exchangeable debt offering is -1.0%. Significantly, this price response is less than the -1.96% abnormal price response for nonregistered secondary offerings and -2.87% abnormal price response for registered secondary offerings documented by Mikkelson and Partch [5] . The less pronounced negative price response on the announcement of an exchangeable debt offering is consistent with the notion that exchangeable debt offers an investor a repurchase guarantee limiting the losses of investors to the price of the implicit call option (see Appendix C). Unlike secondary offerings or equity issues, exchangeable debt offers an investor the guarantee of a "floor" should the stock price of the convert firm fall subsequent to issue. The guarantee of the floor on losses to investors appears to mitigate the information effects of the announcement relative to the information effects of secondary distributions. A second plausible explanation of the smaller price response associated with exchangeable debt issues relative to secondary distributions is that an issuer of exchangeable debt, although well-informed, may, on average, not be as well-informed as the issuers of secondary distributions.8
Around the announcement day, the cross-sectional average abnormal returns for the issuing firms, ARt, are negative from event day t = -4 through event day t = 1, and the average abnormal return on event day t = -I is significant. However, the average abnormal return summed over The R2 of the regression was 24.5%. The intercept of the regression is not significantly different from zero. The slope coefficient of the regression is significantly positive, indicating much of the cross-sectional variation in the issuing firms' price response is attributable to the revaluation of the convert firms' equity.
III. Motivations for Issuing Exchangeable Debt
In this section, I describe several hypotheses put forth to explain the existence of exchangeable debt. First, I consider two tax hypotheses, often mentioned in the financial press, to explain the existence of exchangeable debt, the deferral of capital gains income and the capturing of dividend income. Neither of the tax hypotheses is strongly supported by the data presented here nor do either of the tax hypotheses require the issuance of exchangeable debt. That is, there are alternatives to issuing exchangeable debt which would capture the same tax advantages. Second, I
9Schipper and Smith [71 document positive abnormal gains to parent firms at the announcement of equity carve-outs. The three firms (Tridex. Bergen Brunswig, and Kaufinan & Broad), which simultaneously issued exchangeable debt and performed an equity carve-out of the convert firm, were eliminated from the sample to circumvent the possibility ot a contaminating event. The average two-day abnormal returns around the announcement date for the remaining 28 issuing firms are also insignilicantly different from zero at conventional significance levels.
consider the non-tax motivations for issuing exchangeable debt -specifically, the underwriting costs and valuation effects associated with an exchangeable debt issue. Ultimately, I conclude that exchangeable debt is not sufficiently attractive relative to the alternatives (secondary offerings, block sales, etc.) to make it a more common divestment strategy. Exchangeable debt is a classic example of a "neutral mutation" -a financial innovation likely born from tax considerations without real economic benefits.
A. Tax Motivations for Issuing Exchangeable Debt
The financial press cites two tax features of exchangeable debt as motivating its issuance. First, the issuing firm collects the tax-preferred dividend income on the convert firm's stock (if any). Second, the issuing firm does not realize any capital gains on the convert stock until the conversion feature of the exchangeable debt is exercised. If there is a large accrued capital gain, the deferral of it can result in significant tax savings to the issuing firm. Descriptive evidence presented here suggests that these two features of exchangeable debt do not provide a significant motivation for issuing exchangeable debt. I describe each of the two hypotheses and discuss the empirical evidence regarding each of the hypotheses.
Dividend Tax Arbitrage
Jones and Mason [4] argue that exchangeable debt provides an opportunity to capitalize on the differing tax treatment of interest payments and dividends received. Corporations are allowed to deduct interest expense from taxable income while receiving an 85% corporate dividend tax exclusion as long as the convert's stock was acquired prior to October 1984. After this date, the tax laws changed and prohibited the use of the 85% corporate dividend tax exclusion to be used on securities held as collateral for a possible future transaction, such as exchangeable debt.10 I refer to this motivation for issuing exchangeable debt as the "dividend stripping" hypothesis, as corporations are attempting to divest a block of stock while retaining the rights to dividend income.
In at least two particular issues of exchangeable debt, there is specific evidence that the dividend yield of the convert's stock was a motivating factor in the issue. In Furthermore, the empirical evidence does not support the dividend stripping hypothesis. For example, * The dividend yield on the convert firms is not substantially different from that of the median NYSE/AMEX firm. In fact, eight of the convert firms were non-dividend-paying. * The valuation effects to issuing firms on announcement of the exchangeable debt issue is unrelated to estimates of the tax-preferred dividend income issuing firms would receive on the convert firm.11
Deferring the Realization of Capital Gains
The second central tax feature of exchangeable debt is that it enables the issuer to effectively sell the stock (recall exchangeable debt is essentially a divestment strategy) without realizing the capital gains from the sale until the conversion feature of the debt is exercised -the "capital gains deferral" hypothesis. This method of deferral might dominate holding the stock for later sale in that it allows the issuer to procure a portion of the proceeds through the 
B. Non-Tax Motivations for Issuing Exchangeable Debt
Issuing exchangeable debt is equivalent to selling the convert's stock with a repurchase guarantee. That is, if the price of the convert's stock does not appreciate sufficiently to warrant conversion, the holder of an exchangeable bond is left with the rights to interest and principal payments on the bond while the issuer is left holding the convert's stock. This strategy would make sense if the issuing firm is concerned about the potential price effects of selling the block on the secondary market. As documented earlier, the price response of the convert firm's stock at issue is negative, but smaller in magnitude than the price response associated with secondary distributions, the likely alternative method of disposal. In addition, the cost of issuing exchangeable debt is less than the cost of a secondary distribution. Mikkelson and Partch [5] document the median underwriting costs of a registered secondary offering as 4.7% of the offering value in a sample of 146 registered offerings. These costs do not include the price effect of -2.87% which they document at announcement of the offering. The median underwriting costs of the 31 registered exchangeable debt offerings are 1.56%, significantly less than those associated with a secondary offering. 2 This lower cost, in combination with the lower price response of the convert firm at issue, makes exchangeable debt less costly than a secondary distribution for the disposal of a block of stock. This is the best rationale uncovered for using exchangeable debt as a means of divesting of an intercorporate holding in lieu of the probable alternative -a secondary offering. The fact that only 37 exchangeable debt offerings have been made suggests that there are either unidentified costs which are important or that the apparent cost advantage documented here is not well known.
* Four issuers had positive tax loss carry-forwards making any tax consideration for issuance implausible. * The valuation effects to issuing firms on announcement of the exchangeable debt issue are unrelated to estimates of the capital gains deferred (see footnote 11).
Thus, though the financial press has often cited tax motivations for the issuance of exchangeable debt, these motivations do not hold up well to empirical and analytical investigation. In the next section, I consider non-tax motivations for issuing exchangeable debt. 
IV. Conclusion
The evidence cited in this research indicates that firms issue exchangeable debt conditional on having decided to divest of an intercorporate holding. The anecdotal evidence in the financial press and the observed abnormal price response of -1.0% in the convert firm's stock on announcement of an exchangeable debt issue are both consistent with this interpretation. The price response of the convert firm is less pronounced than the negative price response associated with secondary distributions or block sales. I argue this is a result of the repurchase guarantee implicit in the exchangeable debt offering. The issuing firm guarantees it will keep the convert firm's stock should its value fall below the value of the straight bond component of the exchangeable offering.
Exchangeable debt was probably originally conceived to capitalize on specific features of the tax code. However, these tax motivations do not appear to be potential sources of value for firms issuing exchangeable debt. First, there is no abnormal price response to the issuing firm on the announcement of an exchangeable debt issue. Second, there is no evidence that the price response of the issuing firms is cross-sectionally related to an estimate of the size of the tax benefits associated with issuing exchangeable debt.
A second criticism of the tax hypotheses posed is that 
Appendix C. Pricing Exchangeable Debt
In this appendix, I provide an arbitrage proof for pricing exchangeable debt. The derived pricing formulae prove useful in discussing the motivations for issuing exchangeable debt.
Consider the case of a firm, with value today V, which issues exchangeable debt with face value X which is exchangeable into the stock of the convert firm, with value today S. This debt pays no coupon and the exchange feature is only exercisable at maturity. The bond has no call provision, is the senior claim on the firm's assets, and comes due in one period of length t. The goal of this section is to determine the price of the exchangeable debt today, D.
To price exchangeable debt, I assume the value of the issuing firm has two mutually exclusive components the value of the block of the convert's stock into which the debt is exchangeable, S, and the value of the remaining assets of the issuing firm, A:
V=S+A. (CI)
This final assumption is realistic since the issuing firm in general places the convert's stock in an escrow account at the time of the issuance of the exchangeable debt. This escrow prevents the value of the issuing firm from falling below the value of the convert's stock and thus prevents default on the conversion feature of the bond. Default on the principal payment is, however, still possible.
Given these simplifying assumptions, there are three relevant states at maturity of the exchangeable debenture. The first relevant state is when the issuing firm is in default on the face value of the bond. In this state, the conversion feature is unattractive to bondholders and the value of the issuing firm at maturity is less than the face value of the bond, S* < V* < X. The issuing firm, which is in default, must deliver the value of the firm at maturity, V*, to the bondholders. The second relevant state finds the issuing firm with a value at maturity in excess of the face value of the bond, but the conversion feature remains unattractive, S* <X < VW. In this state, bondholders receive the face value of the bond. The third and final relevant state is one in which the conversion feature has value since this feature exceeds the face value of the bond, X < S* < V*. In this state, bondholders surrender the face value of the bond in exchange for the convert's stock. Given these three relevant states, the payoffs at maturity of the exchangeable debt are easily reconstructed by two different methods. The following three actions would duplicate the payoffs of an exchangeable bond at maturity: * Purchase the block of convert's stock into which the exchangeable bond is convertible, S. * Purchase a European put option which allows the buyer to sell the block of the convert's stock at a price equal to the face value of the exchangeable bond, P(S, X). * Sell a European put option which allows the buyer to sell the value of the issuing firm at a price equal to the face value of the exchangeable bond, P(V, X).
Thus, the price of the exchangeable debt must be equal to the summed prices of the three individual securities today: D = S + P(S, X) -P(V, X).
In this context, the firm which issues exchangeable debt can be viewed as selling the convert's stock with two attached features -one which is value-enhancing to debtholders (the convert's stock can be put back to the firm for a price X) and one which is value-decreasing (the issuing firm has liability limited to the firm's value at maturity).
The following three actions would duplicate the payoffs of an exchangeable bond at maturity: * Purchase the issuing firm, V. * Purchase a European call option which allows the buyer to purchase the block of the convert's stock at price X, C(S, X).
* Sell a European call option which allows the buyer
to purchase the issuing firm at price X, C(V, X).
Again, the price of exchangeable debt must be equal to the summed prices of the three individual securities:
D= V+ C(S,X) -C(V,X). (C3)

